Information Foundation, Reputation Mechanism and Law Enforcement Optimization: A New Vision of Food Safety Governance

The key to information foundation, reputation mechanism and law enforcement optimization. Based on heavy law enforcement burdens and scarce public law enforcement resources, food safety urgently requires innovative forms of governance. The deterrence created by the reputation mechanism fully considers the long-term income flow of the enterprise. It is a kind of efficient social law enforcement to share the law enforcement load of the regulatory agencies with the help of countless consumers. However, the essence of reputational punishment is the efficient flow of information, and the information gap between the modern food industry and the public makes it difficult for consumers to spontaneously form a strong reputation mechanism. The food safety credit file should be the center, and a legal system for integrating information production, classification, disclosure, and communication should be established to ensure that the illegal information of enterprises quickly enters the public's cognitive structure, laying the foundation for consumers to promptly launch reputational punishment. At the same time, we should take the opportunity of the reputation mechanism as an opportunity to actively explore the social governance of food safety, respond to the cost logic contained in the historical development of law enforcement, and achieve law enforcement optimization.

The National Food Safety Law (hereinafter referred to as the “Food Safety Law”) has been in full swing for more than a year. Another famous Chinese company has attracted national attention after the Sanlu Group has triggered a national food safety trust crisis. At one time, the voice of doubts has raised a lot of challenges for the current food safety governance. From the perspective of prevention theory, the essence of all kinds of doubts can be attributed to the following basic questioning: How can potential food safety violations be effectively deterred in order to effectively deter illegal incentives beforehand to deter the theory, this article will Questioning gives a theoretical response with institutional practical significance: based on the double constraint of heavy law enforcement load and insufficient public law enforcement resources, 1 system design should be based on different market masters* This study was awarded the “New Century Excellent Talent Support Program” by the Ministry of Education in 2011. Thank you for your support.

1 Public law enforcement means the law enforcement activities of professional functional departments supported by state public power, which are targeted deterrent tools for private law enforcement and social marginal cost selection. With the help of countless consumers' "vote voting" reputation mechanism, it can promptly launch strict market expulsion punishment, profoundly affect the core interests of enterprises, and effectively deter enterprises from abandoning potential illegal acts. It is an efficient society that assists public law enforcement. Form of governance. Based on its relative technological advantages, the regulatory body should play an active role in the information system of the reputation mechanism, and establish an institutional system covering information production, grading, disclosure, and communication, so as to compensate consumers' cognitive deficiencies and ensure a smooth reputation mechanism. Running. The application of the reputation mechanism in food safety governance is the cost logic of the historical development of law enforcement. It helps to raise the deterrent effect to a reasonable level, and promotes law enforcement optimization with seemingly dispersed and practically powerful social elements. The predicament of inadequate food safety regulation provides a new possibility.

It should be noted that, first of all, compared with individuals, enterprises have become the main producers and suppliers in the modern food industry and social food consumption system, and are constitutive variables affecting public health and safety. Their depth and breadth are far from individual. Comparable (especially large and medium-sized enterprises and well-known enterprises with distribution channels and distribution channels all over the country); Secondly, the current processing and production processes of food production and operation enterprises, or marketing promotion strategies, are more related to the internal professions. Type information, the organization of business operations makes its information imbalance with ordinary consumers more prominent; again, based on the law of consumer psychology, enterprises are more likely to be trusted by the public than individuals, and consumers have higher probability of encountering Food safety risks from enterprises. In recent years, quite a number of enterprises, especially well-known enterprises, have repeatedly experienced major food safety incidents. 1 This is evidenced by the national food safety panic. In order to highlight the core factors and new trends in food safety governance, this article will focus on the enterprise, and individuals belonging to the category of “food producers and operators” under the Food Safety Law and other similar market entities are not included in this article. Analysis framework.

I. Dual Constraints on Food Safety Supervision With the rapid development of chemical synthesis technology and microbial technology, the modern food industry has mutated to a concept with a high degree of law enforcement. Deterrence theory uses this classification method.

1 See Fang Fei: The Legal Perspective of the KFC "Sudan Red" Incident, March 21, 2005, http://; Wang Xiaohai : "In Guangxi, the Staphylococcus aureus Longfeng dumplings are on the black list", April 14, 2007, http://news.163.com/07/0414/10/3ClKQRV2000120GU.html; Infant formula melamine special inspection information base, reputation mechanism and law enforcement optimization uncertainty risk industry. The use of various preservatives, additives, and stabilizers far exceeds the cognitive ability of ordinary consumers, resulting in a significant decline in their self-protection ability. At the same time, due to the information gap between products and consumers in the industrial society, the company's advertising and social network status has become a consumer guide. However, advertising, social network status, etc. are not necessarily reliable guarantees for product quality. The false propaganda effect contained in it is easy to generate another social risk. It is superimposed on technical risks, which increases the uncertainty in food production, circulation and consumption. Sexuality makes the food safety supervision task very difficult. On the back of the increasingly heavy law enforcement load, it is a fairly scarce public law enforcement resource – extremely limited law enforcement personnel, high testing costs, and insufficient equipment, which makes it difficult to obtain adequate support for safety supervision. Law enforcement performance.

Together with the law enforcement load, it constitutes a dual constraint on food safety supervision.

The growing characteristics of trust products have led to a growing information gap between the food industry and consumers, which are increasingly at high risk of uncertainty. First, due to the highly intense work pace of modern society, people's dependence on food products that are convenient and saves housework time is only increasing. Food companies have a fundamental impact on consumers' health and safety and become a major source of risk. One of them, the consumer's own ability to resist risks is significantly reduced. Second, with the changes in the dietary structure of modern society, consumers are bound to contact more food types, health foods, nutritious foods, functional foods, etc., and the variety of transactions has increased in a step by step. See also Dennis W. Karl. D. Jeffrey M. Pelov: Modern Industrial Organization, Hu Hanhui, Gu Chengyan, Shen Hua, Beijing: China Renmin University Press, 2009, pp. 455-456, 474.

2 Richard A. Posner: "Beyond the Law", Su Li translation, Beijing: China University of Political Science and Law Press, 2001, the first security risks. Third, some non-safe foods have a certain incubation period, which has a rather complicated mechanism process with the human body. The consumers cannot know the body feedback in time, and can only recognize the food safety based on the surface symptoms.

Fourth, in many cases, food safety is very lacking in observable and identifiable external characteristics for consumers. Even if similar food safety accidents occur, it is difficult to provide sufficient self-protection for other consumers in the future. Guidelines. 12. Research on social risk informatics based on propaganda effects shows that, based on the cost of search, the frequency and expenditure of commercial advertisements are often the usual indicators for people to speculate on the strength of manufacturers and product quality - "untrustworthy enterprises are less It may be advertised in expensive publications or national television stations. 2 Therefore, companies always choose huge advertising investments, high-frequency advertising, and media with a wide range of radiation capabilities to shape brands and display signals. It is easy to use advertising as an indirect signal to reveal the strength of the company and the quality of its products. This is particularly true for food consumers because of the characteristics of trust. Unless public law enforcement entities publish relevant information, or if there is a major food safety incident, it is difficult for consumers to get a clear understanding of the quality of the food, so they will resort to some seemingly convenient alternative criteria. Under the condition of insufficient information, the more food companies with advertising influence, the more likely they are trusted by consumers. In fact, when the financial strength of a company is not necessarily related to food safety, the indirect signal function of advertising will be alienated into a false propaganda effect.

The social network status of food companies is also an important factor leading to consumer cognition errors. “In the market competition, the social network status of the company reflects the hierarchical system recognized by people in the same field and has important signal functions.” 3 The social network status of a certain enterprise in the same industry is also the lack of more reliable people. The "representative mark" of the product quality is judged at the time of comparing dimensions.

According to the general cognitive logic, a company is in the leading/leading position in the same industry, which usually means that it has outstanding advantages over competitors in terms of production, management and quality. This kind of social order has enabled the company to obtain rich "symbolic capital" - some even become "symbolic production institutions" (such as industry quality standards, participation criteria for evaluation criteria), it is easy to visually, auditory and other sensory dimensions. Influencing the public's judgment; in line with it, consumers naturally can easily use the social status label of the leading/leading enterprise as an important parameter guide for consumption decision-making, and establish a rough causal relationship between status label and quality safety. However, this causal chain is very fragile - the Sanlu Group, which triggered the "melamine trend" in 2008, was one of the three major dairy groups in China. In 2011, the main character of the "Clenbuterol Incident" Shuanghui Group was China's largest meat processing. "trust". Relying on its social network status, the “symbolic meaning system” established by leading/leading companies makes food safety more difficult. A typical example is the report on consumer poisoning caused by clenbuterol since the late 1990s. It is common to see newspapers, but it is difficult for ordinary consumers to judge whether or not clenbuterol really disappears from people's lives. (See "Food Safety in Action: China Policy Forum (below)", China Central Television "Economic Half-hour" 2011 2 Dennis W. Carlton, Jeffrey M. Pelov: "Modern Industrial Organization", 456 page.

3 weeks Xue Guang: Ten Lectures on Organizational Sociology, Beijing: Tsinghua University Press, 2003, p. 261.

Information base, reputation mechanism and law enforcement optimization identification, even if it hides major security risks, it is difficult for consumers to achieve effective screening in advance. The combination of social risk based on propaganda effect and technical risk based on trust characteristics seriously weakens consumers' self-protection ability and greatly increases the law enforcement load of safety supervision.

(2) The scarcity of public law enforcement resources, restricting the performance of food safety supervision. In addition to the increasing burden of law enforcement tasks, another hard constraint of safety supervision is that public law enforcement resources are scarce. From staff to equipment, from testing costs to available funds, investigation reports on food safety supervision in various places generally reflect the serious constraints on law enforcement resources for regulatory performance. Grassroots safety supervision is “less personnel, poor equipment, low level, law enforcement case and supervision basis”. Insufficient investment in capacity building has become a basic generalization of current food safety regulation. Take Yueqing City, Wenzhou City, Zhejiang Province as an example. The city has a local population of 1.2 million and a floating population of over 500,000. The number of food safety law enforcement supervisors is only about 10,000, and the regulatory funds are less than one thousandth of GDP. 2 The eastern coastal developed cities are still the same, and the status quo in the vast central and western regions can be imagined. The public law enforcement resources that have been insufficient, and the heavy law enforcement load are superimposed, it is even more scarce: only for the industrial and commercial administrative system responsible for circulation, “the industrial and commercial administrative organs at all levels and the grassroots industrial and commercial organizations bear 103 laws. 201 regulations, 124 administrative regulations, a total of 428 laws, regulations and rules of supervision and enforcement tasks. 3 Under this rigid constraint, a two-division model of law enforcement and specific law enforcement in China is formed.

The so-called general law enforcement refers to the general law enforcement of the investigated probability of affecting a series of illegal acts through the regular allocation of resources, such as daily supervision and inspection; specific law enforcement is the specialization of thorough investigation and punishment of specific illegal acts. Law enforcement activities, such as special investigations after major cases. This dualistic boundary usually occurs in the situation of insufficient law enforcement resources, and resource allocation is tilted toward specific law enforcement to ensure law enforcement forces in special periods and major events. In China's food safety governance, the common pattern is: the annual supervision of the food market by important festivals such as the Spring Festival and the Mid-Autumn Festival, or a comprehensive investigation after a major accident. Law enforcement resources are always certain. It can only be configured with limited use between different uses. The various uses are competitive with each other. The resources used for A cannot be used at the same time. The use of resources for a specific purpose is not negligible. opportunity cost. Therefore, if the budget for a fixed period of time is difficult to break through, and more resources are invested in specific law enforcement, it will inevitably weaken the general law enforcement against daily supervision, leading to excessive deterrence in specific periods and more deterrence.

1 "Relying on scientific and technological means to ensure food safety", July 11, 2011, http2, see "Communication and Continuous Improvement of Food Safety Supervision Level - Speech by Hu Guangding and Gao Wenshu on behalf of the General Manager of Minjian Yueqing City", February 23, 2010 day.

3 "Food Safety in Action: China Policy Forum (below)", China Central Television "Economic Half-hour" 2011 5 Deterrence excessive and deterrence, revealing the inefficient and unstable state of food safety supervision. The deterrent power of legal supervision depends on the probability of being investigated and the severity of punishment. For potential offenders, the variable regulation is a kind of intermittent, discontinuous “opportunistic punishment” and “opportunistic punishment”. This means that the probability of investigation is reduced. Under the same severe punishment, due to the reduced probability of investigation, the "opportunistic punishment" will be weakened compared with the sustained "regular punishment" deterrence. Therefore, in addition to a very few "top winds", potential offenders can choose the opportunity to evade supervision through the choice of timing - "avoiding the limelight" in the specific law enforcement process. Type violation

Second, strengthen deterrence: the reputation mechanism is caused by technical risks, social risks, the high uncertainty of modern food production, circulation and consumption, making the law enforcement load of the regulatory body very heavy. In addition to the relatively insufficient public law enforcement resources, the combination of dual constraints determines that the system design of food safety governance must have sufficient cost-revenue awareness, must punish efficiency, and strive to maximize potential violations under existing constraints. The deterrent goal is to promote law enforcement optimization.

According to the analysis path of preventive theory, deterrence depends on the probability of investigation and the severity of punishment. There is a reverse correlation between the two variables: if the probability of investigation is not high, there must be strict punishment to match it, so that deterrence can be maintained; only when the probability of investigation is significantly improved, the punishment can be mitigated. Severity. In summary, a low probability corresponds to a severe penalty and a high probability corresponds to a light penalty. 1 clarifying this point is particularly prominent in the present. Food safety supervision is a multi-link, all-encompassing law enforcement activity. The heavy regulatory burden and insufficient law enforcement resources affect the probability of investigation. The increase of probability depends on a series of complex social, economic and technological factors. It has a strong ability to quickly mobilize manpower, material resources and financial resources, and requires more qualitative progress in supporting technology. If these factors are difficult to achieve substantial changes in the short-term under the constraints of the existing material technology level, then the system can be used to enhance the severity of another variable, and the deterrent effect of supervision can be raised to a reasonable level. At the level of the situation, the potential opportunity-type violations are blocked, so as to offset the disadvantages of relatively low probability of investigation. The crux of the matter is what is really effective and severe punishment. Different subjects have different utility functions. For the main cost/return of the same value, see Richard A. Posner: Economic Analysis of Law 》, translated by Jiang Zhaokang, Beijing: China Encyclopedia Publishing House, 1997, pp. 292-301. Posner is evading the punishment of the law for the best combination of the probability of investigation and the severity of punishment. Therefore, the more he is motivated to implement this crime; the more he is motivated, the more severe the punishment must be. Achieving deterrence against this crime. (Richard A. Posner: On Plagiarism, Shen Mingyi, Beijing: Peking University Press, 2010, p. 94) From this it can be inferred that It is easy to be discovered, the more difficult it is for the implementer to escape the legal sanctions, the less the motive for breaking the law/crime, and the lighter punishment can achieve the deterrent goal.

The information foundation, reputation mechanism and law enforcement optimization concept are also different. Just as precious jewels are worthy of the city in the eyes of the rich, in the eyes of extremely hungry people, the value is far less than a bread, and different subjects have very different "loss of loss" caused by the same punishment. 1 The high fines in a certain level are mostly severe punishments for individuals, but for enterprises, especially for large enterprises and well-known enterprises, the same amount of fines is actually low in marginal cost, and the deterrence is very high. low. Here is the question of choosing the right deterrent tool for the marginal cost of different subjects.

The difference between enterprises and ordinary individuals and traders lies in the organization. This feature enables enterprises to obtain long-term institutional life. Due to the extension of organizational life, companies will have a large number of opportunities to meet again with all kinds of game opponents - including but not limited to customers, suppliers, regulatory authorities, etc. - to form a long-term game that will help to oppose opportunism. . In a one-time game or a short-term game, even if an subject adopts an opportunistic strategy, the game's opposite party cannot use the power dimension to punish it because it lacks a continuous opportunity to meet with it in the future, and cannot effectively deter it. . At this time, the short-term psychology of “getting away” will become an important incentive for the perpetrator, and induce non-cooperative behavior represented by deception and fraud. On the other hand, if you are faced with a long-term game relationship, the counterpart of the transaction has the realistic possibility of punishing the lieutenant. The past behavior of a subject and the accompanying reputation will become important parameters of the relative decision, breaking the communication and turning to other The market subject will become a credible deterrent, and reputation will become an effective restraint mechanism for opportunistic strategies. At this time, “running a monk can't run the temple” will become the main decision-making parameter of the market. It can be said that due to its organizational nature, the company is in a long-term game, which makes future trading opportunities closely related to its past behaviors. The counterparty will decide whether to continue cooperation according to the reputation of the company's past behaviors, that is, reputation impact. Future trading opportunities. 2 In other words, if the flow of information is smooth, the organizational characteristics of the enterprise can make it more value-oriented than the average individual or trader, give higher value to its future, and comprehensively consider the long-term benefits brought about by the cooperation. . It is precisely because of concerns about the loss of future trading opportunities and future greater returns that enterprises (especially large enterprises and well-known enterprises) are likely to avoid the possibility of fraudulent individuals or traders sitting between them and taking advantage of opportunistic strategies. Lee's "hammer trading", 3 is more likely to become a carrier of reputation, thus becoming an important mechanism for transforming the "secondary game" common to stranger trading into a "repetitive game" for sustainable income. 4 Can imagine, can To achieve appropriate “strict punishment” for enterprises, the following multiple levels of action should be systematically considered: (1) direct expenditure in the form of fines; (2) current trading opportunities lost due to punishment; (3) seeing Zhang Weiying for consumers 3 : Information, Trust and Law, Beijing: Sanlian Bookstore, 2003, p. 43. It should be noted that if information is not smooth, corporate conduct is not perceived by the public, then the opportunistic behavioral strategy remains intact. Long-term revenue streams, at which point companies do not have to worry about losing future trading opportunities. This is the importance of the information base to be analyzed below.

The long-term boycott of purchases leads to a reduction or even complete loss of future trading opportunities; (4) the brand value is derogated or even completely lost. The essence of the enterprise lies in obtaining a steady stream of income in the future for a long period of time. If the information on the production and sale of toxic and harmful foods flows quickly and efficiently among consumers and forms a strong reputation mechanism, the punishment from reputation will greatly affect The countless future trading opportunities of the company determine the survival of the company and its brand.

Why does the reputation mechanism play a decisive role in the structure of the company's interests? In the modern industrial and commercial society with division of labor and transactions as the core, the main form of transaction is that the non-personalized “stranger trading” parties are highly asymmetric of information. As a social record of past behavior, reputation provides traders with important decision-making information and becomes the main source of information, thus determining whether the transaction is successful or not. Compared with commercial advertising and the social network status of enterprises in the industry, reputation is actually a public opinion with stronger signal function. If there is an accurate reputation mechanism for information, consumers are more inclined to use it as a solution to information incompleteness. And asymmetrical tools. As a result, there are countless potential trading opportunities that can be repeated, and severe market expulsion punishments are initiated, and the long-term income stream of the company's wings is also lost. In this sense, the reputation mechanism is “the weapon of the weak”, and 1 is a “severe penalty” with a very high marginal cost. In practice, although it is only beginning to take shape, there are also cases of reputational punishment. The park was exposed to the use of Chenchong to make moon cakes. As a result, the manufacturers of “Guanshengyuan” all over the country suffered greatly, and the sales volume dropped sharply. 2 After the Yasli middle-aged milk powder was declared as the top ten problem milk powder by the State Administration for Industry and Commerce, not only immediately In the shopping malls around the world, other products such as Yashili infant milk powder have also been "suddenly tired" and less people care about it. The formation of a similar "connected" brand of strains (such "strains" has also produced some excessive effects, see later Analysis) 3 The most serious is the Sanlu Group, which used to be the “giant” of the dairy industry. After the melamine trend, the Sanlu brand became a negative asset and became a disgusting negative symbol – just as Hitler’s fall, very few Some people named Adolf. 4 In addition to the boycott in the commodity market, the "problem company" of food safety will also be hit hard in the capital market: "Less meat After the reunification of Shuanghui shares, it was closed at the beginning of the stock market. 5 The capital chain is an important lifeline of modern enterprises. Once suddenly broken, the prospects of enterprises are worrying.

Although the current China food safety regulatory task is still very difficult, it is undeniable that it is triggering the consumption year on February 23.

After the information base, reputation mechanism and law enforcement optimizers implemented the market expulsion, the safety level of the above-mentioned food industry has improved slightly compared with the past, and the reputation penalty that is still in its infancy has exerted a certain deterrent. “The widespread dissemination of information can generally reduce the society’s evaluation of offenders, thus making the offender vulnerable to dealing with others, thereby enabling the offender to take the initiative to make legitimate behavior choices, thereby alleviating the pressure on law enforcement in public institutions. The value of this kind of publicity is especially important in a market-based society where labor division and trade are developed. Its promotion of law enforcement is in many cases a comparison of simple fine tools. 1 It is precisely because of the deterrence of reputation mechanism creation. Taking full account of the multi-stage income of the enterprise and deeply influencing the core part of the enterprise's interest structure, the latter can effectively deter and abandon potential illegal activities, thus sharing part of the law enforcement load of the regulatory body and improving law enforcement performance. .

The basis of reputation punishment lies in information. Even if it is in the short-term, it will not be able to significantly improve the probability of investigation. As long as the illegal information of existing enterprises can enter the cognitive structure of consumers in time, a collective consensus is quickly formed. A developed market trading system. It is also enough to rely on “boycott purchases” to warn other companies to abandon potential limps, which has a considerable deterrent effect. However, due to the information gap between modern food production and circulation, it is difficult for consumers to spontaneously form a strong reputation mechanism. It should rely on the relative technical advantages of the regulatory agencies in the production, dissemination and processing of food safety information, 2 to provide an information base for consumers to “vote with their feet”, in order to establish an institutionalized and sufficiently stable reputation deterrence. Reference to the source of information on reputation is generally easy to relate to the food safety credit file that China will implement. In fact, if the focus of food safety credit files is only on information recording and distribution, then under the conditions of various information flows in the “communication era”, this system concept still cannot guarantee that the reputation mechanism will play its proper deterrent function. .

The reputational mechanism plays a deterrent function and requires strict social conditions. In summary, there are three: First, information elements. 3 The information on the production and sale of toxic and harmful foods must be able to enter the information structure of consumers in time and become the public information of consumption choices. Second, the power requirements. The "power" here is a social functional concept, and it is not necessarily related to the public power subject. Its implication is to reverse the ability of the opponent's cost-benefit relationship. If many consumers are aware of the wrongful behavior of the enterprise and can make the enterprise lose more than its own consumption choices, then it can be said that the power requirements are met. Third, time requirements. What is going on between the business and the consumer is a long-term game, and its illegal behavior can be punished by the opportunity of countless encounters between the two sides. From the time point of view, the enterprise itself is an organizational arrangement that transforms the “one-time game” into the “repetitive game”, and despite the current lack of law enforcement resources, the probability of investigation of food safety violations has not yet reached an ideal level. Regulatory authorities fail to meet sufficient and complete standards in information supply, but they still have considerable comparative technical advantages compared with ordinary consumers. If the illegal information obtained under the current investigation probability level can be “deep processed” through a series of links such as grading, disclosure, dissemination and feedback, so that it can truly enter the consumer's cognitive structure and become an effective purchasing decision guide, the regulatory agency still It is a positive information provider, and of course it can play a role in the information infrastructure of the reputation mechanism.

3 The significance and access to information in food safety governance. (See Jian Jiangang: "To tell the truth to power: the prospect of re-engagement between food-payers and the future re-encounting guarantees the possibility of the latter to impose punishment, 1 and thus the slang of "running a monk can't run the temple"; From the perspective of power, most food industries are in a competitive market, and their products have a wide variety of substitutes or similar products. Consumers can adopt the strategy of “exiting purchase” and turning to other competitors to sanction a company’s illegal activities. Market-to-transaction is the lifeline of an enterprise. Once the “exit purchase” strategy is extended from the individual to the group, it is tantamount to subverting the cost-benefit relationship of the enterprise, and may even declare the end of the enterprise. In the era when the commodity is not scarce, the power requirement It is not difficult to satisfy. Therefore, the key to the problem lies in whether the information flows smoothly and evenly. The recording and centralized distribution of information does not necessarily mean that the above information requirements are met. Under the premise that there is a regular release system for food quality information in China, According to a survey conducted by CCTV, there are still up to 86.7% of respondents who believe that the food is solved. The safety issue should “increase the exposure of illegal enterprises”. The proportion of respondents who choose “heavy code reform, strengthen relevant laws and regulations” and “strengthen producer education and self-discipline” is nearly 5 percentage points (82.1%), exceeding The proportion of selecting “reinforcing supervision by relevant departments” is as high as nearly 19 percentage points (67.9%). It can be seen that most consumers believe that they are still in a “uninformed” situation, and public law enforcement entities have not dealt with the existing illegal information. Can successfully connect with the consumer's information structure, fail to become an effective parameter of consumer decision-making, leading to communication failure. The lack of necessary information is not difficult to find, the information base of reputation is far more complicated than the release of a single food safety credit record. Much more, it is not only a summary and centralized release of information, but also a systematic category covering information production, grading, disclosure, and communication. It should change the one-way information transmission mode and take a holistic standpoint around the plan. Food safety credit file, whether the relevant information truly becomes part of the consumer information structure, whether it is actually sent The guiding role of the consumption decision-making is to test the standard and establish a credit system from information production to information feedback, which promotes the efficient flow of illegal information in the public and provides a solid foundation for consumers to initiate reputational punishment.

III. Information Foundation: The system of food safety credit structure The information infrastructure of reputation needs a holistic perspective. If the credit file is the core, the food safety credit system under the concept can be classified, disclosed, disseminated and feedback integrated. Then it will become an effective information base. In this sense, a systemic system of food safety credits should be developed from the following levels.

Providing food safety credit information by regulators should be an efficiency-oriented measure: if information can be perceived by some people at a relatively low supervision cost, it will be a better choice for this group of people to provide information. Technical advantages and information processing capabilities determine that regulators should play an active role in the information of reputation mechanisms. However, the essence of reputation is to have a clear grading system as a support. If we neglect the uniformity of rating standards, such as the “multi-center pattern” of China's food safety standards system, then despite the “Food Safety Law” for safety credit files. The original intent of the legislation is to use the information superiority of the regulatory body to judge the advantages and disadvantages of the food safety obligation of the enterprise. The uncertainty of the judgment will still dissolve the distinguishing function of the food safety credit file, so that it cannot give the credit level of the enterprise. An accurate public evaluation cannot form a stable hierarchical structure in the public's cognition; at the same time, the information superiority of the regulatory body also loses its proper meaning. It can be said that the lack of uniform standards and the well-intentioned credit file system can not only provide reliable safety guidance for consumers' judgments and decision-making, but also make the current food market information more messy, and the expectation of constructing the information base of the reputation mechanism is also expected. So it fell.

The credit rating standard is also a fair game process that balances and coordinates the interests of all parties. It must be based on an effective negotiation mechanism to ensure that the respective demands of stakeholders involved in food safety can be met by Zhou Xueguang: Organizational Sociology Ten Lectures, pp. 272-274.

Zhou Xueguang: Ten Lectures on Organizational Sociology, p. 252.

Fully expressed, different voices can be listened to seriously. Otherwise, the lack of a multi-discrimination credit standard is easily alienated into a department, interest group "1 language hall" lost the proper meaning of protecting consumers. The construction of the negotiation mechanism should focus on the following key dimensions.

First, establish a unified communication and coordination organization. A highly authoritative coordinating body is a powerful lever to eliminate disagreements and reach consensus. This is an effective institutional arrangement for many countries in food safety governance. Typical example is the central department established by the UK in 1978 as a local authority trade standard coordination agency. The main purpose is to provide a forum for the country’s enterprises to resolve differences and differences, and for enterprises in other countries. The problems encountered provide the main points of consideration. 1 In China's institutional practice, taking into account the authority and decision-making level, the Food Safety Office of the State Council can serve as the central coordination function, laying the organizational foundation for effective communication.

Second, identify stakeholder participation as a full-scale right. The unified credit rating standard involves multiple stages, including information research, draft announcement, opinion collection, and question feedback, which form a chain of sequential programs. If stakeholders can only selectively participate in one or several links rather than all, their information is still insufficient, and the right to know and express are still incomplete, and they cannot affect the allocation of rights and obligations that are closely related to them. This is also a testament to the success of food safety in the United Kingdom.承担公私部门合作规制、融合政府监管和利益团体协商的“规制影响评估”(RegulatoryImpactAssessment,即RIA),就常常被认为进入决策程序太迟,以至无法对法律颁布产生显著影响。 ②再次,规定消费者团体、产业部门的法定参与主体资格。信用评级标准的均化主要影响两类利益,一为消费者的安全利益,一为生产者/销售者的经济利益。两大利益如何达致公平、合理的均衡点,既有效保护消费者食品安全,又为食品行业技术升级提供充分激励、推动行业发展转型,是统一信用标准能否成功的关键所在。在这个意义上,应当合理借鉴域外行之有效的制度实践,在拟议的《〈食品安全法〉实施办法》中明确规定消费者团体、产业部门的法定参与资格,确保“沟通理性''的实现。(1)消费者团体参与。在欧盟层面,由于1996年以来的牛绵状脑病引发席卷全欧洲的食品安全危机,消费者对于食品信任度急剧下跌。而其之所以能够在较短的时间内恢复消费者信心,关键之在于消费者(通常以消费者保护机构的形式)对于政策决定过程的积极参与:消费者的主体资格得到了欧盟委员会的明确认可,信息基础、声誉机制与执法优化消费者参与作为指导欧盟委员会提出建议的五项核心原则之一得以确立下来。①在这个意义上,消费者保护机构的策略能够覆盖制度安排,而这一制度安排中消费者协会也成为有影响力的组织参与者。②作为欧盟成员国之一,英国的制度创新尤其具有参照意义。2000年成立的食品标准机构(FoodStandardsAgency,即FSA)下设消费者委员会,作为在FSA中承认消费者利益的形式,直接代表消费者的利益和诉求。由此消费者不再仅仅是作为组织行动的接收端,而是作为一类社会角色、凭借本身的权利被整合进入制度结构,具有了明确的决策参与职能。③(2)产业部门参与。产业部门作为统信用标准的决策程序参与者,不仅能够为监管部门提供关于遵循规制的成本信息,更重要的是,一些企业为了树立品牌形象,塑造良好的质量声誉,会在标准的设定上采取”力争上游“的原则,提出比公共标准更为严格的私人标准。这种”争先“的行动有助于评级标准及时优化升级,是对于消费者安全更具有能动性的保护。此时,其在标准决策程序中的参与就是一个转化机制,使得更优的私人标准有可能上 为统的公共标准。加拿大在这方面的经验别具特色,即便与英美等国相较也是非常独特的:通过产业主体参与制定程序,一个官方正式的转化机制得以建立,私人标准在其中获得校验和承认,追溯到原料源头的”农场级食品安全计划“也由此成为监管部门监督食品安全绩效的可行手段。④(二)信用记录、披露应当易懂、清晰、可靠其,按照共享程度的高低,信息可分为专业型与常识型两类。所谓专业型信息,是具有自己独特的范畴、定义、方法,对其正确解码必须具备达到临界点的知识存量和相关参照系,共享程度较低的信息。由是观之,当前的食品安全监管多采用”专业型信息“的发布模式。比如,各级工商行政管理机关对流通领域各类食品质量的监测结果定期公示,一般使用”苯甲酸、甜蜜素、山梨酸钾、脱氢乙酸钠、菌落总数“等专业 语来表述食品检测情况。这种模式对于大多数普通消费者来说,2006),pp.l27,128.欧盟五项核心原则是:清晰界定食品链中利益相关者的角色和责任;饲料、食物及其成分的可追溯性;食品政策的透明性;食品安全政策必须以风险分析为基础(风险管理决策中运用预防性原则);消费者积极参与食品安全政策。

如果没有恰当的注解和说明,他们的信息接收成本必定十分高昂。因为从知识社会学的规律看,能否正确理解某一信息,能否对之正确解码,关键取决于对问题的熟悉程度,①而熟悉程度又是由个体的信息存量和知识结构决定的,在分工程度日益深化的现代社会,专业化已经成了重要的无知之源,大部分公众对于自己职业知识以外的其他信息都存在一定的认知盲点。相关的报道也证实了这一点:对于糖果、糕点生产中常用的、并且基本上在所有包装的成分说明上均有标示的“山梨酸钾、脱氢乙酸钠即通常所说的防腐剂),普通消费者也无法确知,最多只能大致猜测。②由于分工造成的知识结构差异,公众与监管机构对食品安全信息的敏感度是不同的。在关于日常监督检查结果、违法行为查处等信用信息的记录、披露过程中,应当避免过度专业化,对专业术语加以必要的常识性说明,使得安全信用信息能够以较低的解码成本被普通消费者所理解,为声誉机制的信息获得提供应有的认知保障。

其二,依照《食品安全法》第79条的要求,记录违法行为查处是信用档案的重要功能之一,而违法行为又可以按照危害程度不同区分成多种类型,这就要求信用记录、披露必须对查处的企业违法行为定性准确、表述清晰。笼统模糊的信息将混淆不同危害程度的违法行为之间的界限,异化声誉机制,大大削弱其边际威慑力。

在很多情形下,企业面临多种违法可能:标签/包装不合格,成分的实际含量超出/低于标示数值,添加有毒有害物质,等等。这些行为的危害具有本质差别,不同行为应当对应不同严厉程度的惩罚。当各类情形不加区分地一概以“不合格产品''笼统记录并发布之时,消费者的反应是相同的――为安全起见,都以”拒绝购买“作为应对,尤其是在食品安全形势严峻的情形下,他们不可能、也没有足够的动力进一步探究这些”不合格产品“的违法差别何在,2006年的”雅士利奶粉事件“即是明证。③如此来,对具有潜在违法可能性的企业而言,”大违法“与”小违法“都①参见理查德A.波斯纳:《超越法律》,第588页。

③在2006年“雅士利奶粉事件”中,雅士利2006年3月8日批次生产的400g袋装中老年奶粉中铁、维生素B1含量超过标示值,且标签不合格(但质量符合国家强制标准),在被国家工商总局宣布为十大“不合格奶粉”之一后,各大卖场纷纷将其撤市、下架,甚至雅士利其他品牌的产品――如婴幼儿奶粉也未能幸免。大部分受访的消费者都表示拒绝购买该品牌下的任何奶粉,但是并不清楚企业的具体违法原因。(参见欧志葵:《雅士利奶诸如标签不合格之类的较轻违法行为无需公示,以防不必要的恐慌。(参见应飞虎、涂法性质等级给出准确的认定操作标准之前,以清晰的违法事实表述来避免威慑过度,也不失为一种预防措施。

信息基础、声誉机制与执法优化样,在公众的声誉认定上没有区分,都会招致市场驱逐式的严厉惩罚。如果前者比后者获得更多利益,其势必选择危害较大的行为而非危害较小的行为,从而消除有效惩罚的边际威慑力种使潜在违法者以较轻的违法活动替代较重的违法活动的激励,①诱发更多具有更大危害性的违法(甚至犯罪)行为,扭曲声誉机制的威慑功能。

基于执法资源颇为紧张,即使无法完全阻却企业的所有违法行为,能够激励其只是从事轻微危害的行为――比如标签不合格,而非严重危害社会的活动――比如添加有毒有害化合物,同样是相当可观的执法绩效。声誉机制威慑功能的扭曲无异于浪费稀缺的执法资源,减损执法效率,意在促进消费者“知情”的举措本不该产生与优化执法相抵触的消极后果。我们在安全信用的建构过程中,应当记取“雅士利奶粉事件”的有益警示,注意避免这种未曾预期的“制度之失”。

其三,除了日常监督检查结果、违法行为查处之外,信用档案还可以包括披露新闻媒体舆论监督的相关信息。②新闻监督纳入食品安全信用体系,极大地丰富了消费者的信息源,有助于促使声誉的信息基础更加全面、完备。不过,信息来源更加丰富的背后,隐藏的信息失真的风险也随之增加。对于媒体报道的企业食品安全事件,在信用档案予以记录、披露之前应当由发布主体经法定的调查程序进行核实,确保信息的可靠性。

大众传媒讲求的是信息传播,新鲜性、时效性是媒体传播活动的核心目标之一,而食品安全本身涉及诸多专业判断标准,媒体本身并非专家,在“赶发新闻”的时间压力下,对于技术概念、数值标示等难免会出现表述偏误。比如,“啤酒生产过程中使用甲醛”被简化报道为“啤酒含有甲醛”,以至于一时间消费者“谈啤色变”,以为啤酒成品中含有甲醛,国外市场也纷纷抵制中国啤酒。比报道偏误更糟糕的是报道失实。为了第一时间吸引读者注意力,某些媒体甚至在完全未经调查的情况下就对“纸箱馅包子”、“红药水西瓜”抢先报道,结果经查实,这些都是自编自导的、彻头彻尾的假新闻。③不难想见,没有设置核实程序予以把关,失误、失实的新闻信息记入信用档案并向公众披露后势必引发消费恐慌,导致企业遭遇不公正的市场惩罚。

对于声誉惩罚失误,即便是食品安全法治状况较为理想的欧盟国家――典型的诸如德国,也更注重由当局通过支付补偿进行事后救济,少有事前的预防机制。

聂国春:《什么是食品安全信用档案》,《中国消费者报》2009年10月19日,第A02版。

③曾理、叶慧珏:《尴尬的食品安全报道――从不规范的媒体行为到不健全的信息传播体但是声誉罚的严厉不仅体现在当下,更延及未来,企业声誉一旦损坏,在很长一段时间内都难以修复。无论是为有效惩罚违法企业,还是公平保护守法企业,声誉机制都必须保证信息基础的可靠性。在这个意义上,核实程序必定是新闻媒体参与食品安全信用建设的有机组成部分,必须“未雨绸缪”,借助事先核查机制将守法企业被“误伤”的可能性降到最低。

(三)拓展信息流动渠道,实现有效传播当信息负荷过量时,人们的信息接收往往具有强烈的路径依赖特点,他们总是选择自己最常用、最习惯的接收模式,把注意力更多地分配在常用渠道承载的信息上。因此,信息发布就存在一个是否满足有效传播的重要问题。如果信息仅仅只是完成了向外发送,而并未能够在接收者的常用渠道流动,他们将不会把有限的注意力分配于此,导致无效传播。概言之,人们对信息的关注、接收是选择性的,他们的反应契合注意力经济学的逻辑:信息被关注、接收的程度与流动渠道密切相关。

当前,我国已经存在诸如食品质量监测结果定期公示的信息发布活动,从功能上看,应当既能够使得消费者“知情”,也能够以“公之于众”给予生产者相当的警示和威慑――因为消费者知悉之后,随之而来的将是严厉的市场驱逐。但是,正如国家质检总局指出的那样:“几乎每个案件,都有生产者故意违法违规的问题'',①违法者显然是自恃”消费者还是不知情“而无所顾忌,高达86. 7%的受访者认为”应加大对违法企业的曝光力度“也恰恰说明,既有的信息发布尚未实现有效传播的目标。在发布模式的选择上,现有的食品安全信息公示一般采用职能部门的专业网站作为信息流动渠道,诸如质检系统、工商系统的官方网站等等。这类惯用的发布模式在不少国家都未能引起足够的警醒:以加拿大食品检验局(CanadianFoodInspectionAgency,即CFIA)为例,如果成功进行了一食品安全检控,CFIA也只是发布新闻稿,将细节公布在其官方网站上。②但是当前的问题在于,现代职业活动的集约化和分工程度大大增加,人们的精力更多地被约束在职业范围内,在各种信息潮令人目不暇接之际,路径依赖就会起作用:自己熟知的、本职业/专业的信息渠道,或者是大众型、常识型的信息载体总是更受青睐,职业/专业之外的其他专门性信息流动则很难引起普通公众的足够关注,尽管信息已经向外发送,却仍然未能进入受众的认知结构,消费者仍然处于”不知情“的状态。

①《食品安全在行动:中国政策论坛(下)》,中国中央电视台《经济半小时》2011年5年2月25日。

信息基础、声誉机制与执法优化如果信息的接收需要人们特意改变自己的浏览、阅读等信息获取习惯,则无异于从一开始就埋下了传播失败的种子。食品安全信用构设应当避免信息渠道过窄的缺陷,注意使所选传播模式契合消费者的认知规律,在现有的专业性媒体之外,还应当选择大部分消费者最经常接触的媒介,进一步扩大信息流动渠道。全国性的信用信息发布,可以考虑与譬如新浪、搜狐、网易等具有稳定、巨大访问量的门户网站进行发布合作;对地方性信息而言,则可以考虑选择具有区域重大影响力和知名度的媒体――比如当地主要的晚报、时报等――实行同步传播。根据可得性、易接近性原则,还可以参照美、加、英等国的做法,将检查结果直接张贴在经营场所外,便于消费者知悉。这种强烈市场影响。①借助这类共享程度很高的公共通道,大多数普通公众能够快速获取安全信用信息,迅速形成社会共识和集体记忆,进而及时启动大规模的声誉罚。

信息必须能够与接收者的行为选择具有实质关联,否则“那就只是信息发布者的独白'',②而”信息独白“无异于信息闲置和执法资源的浪费。信用信息主要来自于食品安全监管,这是项资源耗费密集型的活动,可以说,信息的生产成本为数不菲。在当前执法资源相当紧张的条件下,以有效传播为目标,注重最大限度为消费者所知晓来变革流动模式,意味着提升了信息的使用效率,其实是一种虽不直接、但是相当重要的提高执法绩效的考量。从整体主义的视角看,这一考量已经超越安全信用制度本身,对于全局性的食品安全治理目标也具备了积极的意义。

(四)建立健全的反馈一监督机制如果企业具有不良信用记录,不仅按照《食品安全法》第79条的规定将增加被监督检查的频次,更重要的是将被取消未来无数个交易机会,丧失可观的收入流;倘若企业被认定为长期信用良好,则会获得相应的宣传、支持和表彰,这种褒扬有助于塑造企业的公共形象,使之获得由于“好名声”带来的价格溢价。③借助奖惩功能,安全信用制度必定对企业的生产经营产生深刻影响,因此其实施将是个重要的利益再分配过程。

当关涉利益分配的权力行使没有利益相关者的反馈,缺乏监督机制,这里就存在一种既无效率、更不公平的垄断。企业信用认定过程不可观察,也无从评价,本②金自宁:《作为风险规制工具的信息交流:以环境行政中的TRI为例》,《中外法学》属于“公共物品”的信用信息变成了监管者可以操控的“私人信息'',其可以借助选择性地公布违法信息,或者是对违法行为的查处畸轻畸重,抑或是任意分配宣传/表彰等机会,寻求非法的信息租金。

没有健全的反馈一监督机制,信用制度不仅不完备,而且有可能走向异化。应当建立由所辖区域公众、消费者协会、上级主管部门三方共同组成的监督体系,定期对食品安全信用制度的运行情况进行公开反馈与评判。在设计细节上,可以采用绩效记分卡,设置概括性的评价指标、分析项目并在记分卡上列明,做出对应于信用信息生产一分级一披露一传播等各环节的统计,由参与各方分别给出相应分值,最后形成加权平均值并赋予考评等级。易言之,反馈一监督的功能在于为声誉机制的信息提供者一一负责食品安全信用建设的监管主体一一也建立一个执法信誉评价体系,使其执法行为同样要接受公共评判,同样要受到来自社会大众的声誉约束。对信用发布者的信誉管理,同样是声誉机制建设不可或缺的重要内容。

特别需要指出的是,这种信誉管理是以消费者为中心的公众导向型,而非常规的科层导向型。普通消费者参与反馈一监督机制,是一个将原本分散的市场力量予以组织化的过程。从集体行动逻辑来讲,作为食品安全信用信息的需求方,消费者的组织程度越高,对于信息质量的要求就越高,对于监管主体施加的外部推动力也越强,基于信用信息的社会声誉也越容易形成。在即将展开的制度设计中,尤其需要注意发挥消费者的组织化力量,以经济、俭省的方式推进声誉机制建设。

四、食品安全的社会治理之道资源约束是任何类型的公共执法都无法回避的现实挑战。要支撑一个职业阶层的公共执法活动,任何社会都要有一定的经济剩余,①并通过税收收入和分配转化为法律实施的资源基础。当囿于物质技术水平而无法获得足够支持时,各种社会力量就会充当公共执法的替代或补充。在社会发展早期,并没有严格意义上的公共执法,很多法律的实施都由私人来进行一一“在好几个世纪中,英国议会和市政当局(包括私人公司和个人)曾为查获违法者和对其定罪支付补助。在违法行为被处以罚金的情况下,罚金就在英王和私人实施者之间分割。在此不存在任何公诉人,而且警察也只是在名义上是公共的”。②进入现代社会,执法成本仍然是各国都存在的普信息基础、声誉机制与执法优化适性问题,基于成本压力,现代执法体制相继发展出了自我报告、①悬赏举报等制度因应。前者通过减轻处罚激励违法者主动披露信息,后者借助物质奖励促使旁观者/知情者为执法主体提供信息,目的都是充分利用各种可能的社会因素以应对法律实施的成本负担,在既有的资源水平下实现执法绩效最优。

声誉机制在食品安全治理中的适用,恰恰应和了执法历史发展所蕴含的成本逻辑,是一种以社会力量推进执法优化的治理之道。当前应如何改进食品安全的公共执法从主管部门到专家学者,再到普通公众,大都提出“严厉执法”、“重典治乱”

作为对策回应,或者强调改革“多部门共管”的管理体制。显然,这些考量对于促进食品安全监管均具有积极的借鉴意义,但是基于目前相当稀缺的执法资源,如果一种制度构想既可以及时缓解监管机构的执法负荷,更可以借助无处不在的社会之力强化惩罚的威慑、充分发挥对潜在违法行为的阻吓作用,那么它同样是一种辅助公共执法的可行选择。通过无数消费者的“用脚投票”,声誉机制深入作用于企业的长期收入流,深刻影响其利益核心,其威慑效应远非“提高数额若干倍”

一类的罚款规制可比。可以说,它充分结合了公共执法主体的专业信息优势和众多消费者的市场惩罚优势,有效促使企业放弃潜在的违法行为,在相当程度上分担了监管机构的执法负担,是一种讲求效率的社会治理形式。其实从阻吓功能来看,声誉机制也正是一种对“重典治乱”颇有实践意义、成本颇为俭省的制度呼应。不难预期,只要“在违法行为众多而导致公共机构执法压力过大或执法资源严重缺乏的情形下,就会产生对这种制度的大幅需求”。②任何治理活动都是一个系统性工程,食品安全治理亦然。倘若秉持“监管中心主义”立场,仅仅着眼于监管机构本身来进行制度设计,那么这种单一的视角很容易遮蔽关于潜在的违法行为何以被有效阻吓的重要知识、遮蔽了同样可以发挥积极治理作用的各种社会力量――特别是最终决定企业生命的普通消费者,实际上仍然无法突破执法资源严重不足的现实瓶颈,仍然没有解决执法负荷的“无法承受之重”。在这个意义上,依托安全信用构筑的信息基础,以声誉机制为切入点,及时把业团体、监管机构的制度实践,必将为执法优化找寻到一个可行的突破点,为破解当前的食品安全监管困境打开一片崭新的视野。

〔责任编辑:刘鹏责任编审:张芝梅〕

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